Battle of Adowa
The invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 is actually preceded by another symbolic event of historical import in the epic memory of Pan-African Nationalism known as the Battle of Adowa (1896). This latter event was the armed rejection of imperial Italy’s initial encroachment on Ethiopia. Italy’s actions, at that time, were reflective of the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, the so-called, “Scramble for Africa” conference. The conference produced documented commitment to the cooperative pursuit of Africa’s exploitation. A particular document titled, General Act of the Berlin Conference was addressed to:
1. The Empress of India;
2. The emperors of Germany, Austria, the Russias, the Ottomans;
3. The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland;
4. The kings of Prussia, Bohemia, Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Norway;
5. The Grand Duke of Luxembourg; and
6. The presidents of the United States of America, and the French Republic (Annex to Protocol No. 10: General Act of the Berlin Conference 1973, 288).
While this conference focused primarily on the “free navigation on the two chief rivers of Africa flowing into the Atlantic Ocean …” (288) it also addressed the criteria of settling the African coast. Part of a document issued from that conference provides a glaring example of the latter:
Chapter 6. Declaration relative to the essential Conditions to be observed in order that new Occupations on the Coasts of the African Continent may be held to be effective.
ARTICLE 34
Any Power which henceforth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African continent outside of its present possessions, or which being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them, as well as the Power which assumes a protectorate there, shall accompany the respective act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the present Act, in order to enable them, if need be, to make good any claims of their own.
ARTICLE 35
The Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to insure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed upon. (Ibid., 299-300)
Italy was a relatively young “national” entity at this conference. It had become a nation-state in 1861. National unity for Italy required a battle for liberation against the Bourbons. Garibaldi successfully led that battle (Davidson 1992). England was his ardent supporter and under his lead England’s approach toward Africa was mimicked, as seen in Davidson’s statement:
After the unification of Italy in 1861 the new Italian nation-state would turn quite shamelessly to colonial enterprises in Africa. The very steamship company whose boats had carried the Thousand to Sicily would be foremost in Italian colonialism; and Garibaldi himself would speak in favor of loading on Africans the chains of servitude that Italy had struck from itself. (1992, 127)
“By the time Italy and Germany became colonial adventurers in Africa, they were barely three decades young” (Tibebu 1995, 23). The Red Sea port of Assab was declared an Italian colony in 1882 after being obtained by the Societa Rubattino, a private Italian shipping company. The shipping company itself had acquired the port from an Italian Lazarist missionary named Giuseppe Sapeto. Mr. Sapeto had purchased the port from a local sultan for “6000 Maria Theresa dollars” (Akpan 1985, 265).
The fact that such penetration was possible reveals the fragile situation in that part of Africa at that time. Competing empires plagued Africa during this century and the horn of Africa was no exception. As Italy encroached, Emperor Yohannes was more concerned with the suffocating pressure of Egypt, which then ruled much of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden coasts and the port of Massawa. Egypt, however, had come under the occupation of the British Empire in the same year of the Italian purchase of the port of Assab. Egyptian concerns in the area became British concerns and both were primarily concerned with the Sudanese uprising of the Mahdists.
The advance of the Mahdists and the retreat of the British caused Egyptian rule to collapse on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area bordering Ethiopia. Britain was temporarily rebuffed but not totally beaten. To the British Empire the opposition existed on two fronts: rebellious Africans and imperialist competitors. The empire chose first to retreat and regroup.
Brilliant in its ability to manipulate affairs of states, Britain sought the support of the Abyssinian ruling class in its evacuation efforts. Abyssinia pledged cooperation but requested that England return territory bordering Egypt to Ethiopia as well as the port of Massawa and the city of Harar. To the first part of this request, Britain easily capitulated, as it was no longer able to maintain a presence in those areas. Concerning the port, “Britain merely promised free transit ‘under British protection’ for Ethiopian goods, including arms and ammunition” (Akpan 1985, 267). Both parties signed an agreement to this arrangement on June 3, 1884. With this agreement the Ethiopian military relaxed and fell into Britain’s counter offensive.
The counter offensive was the advance of Italy on the port of Massawa in 1885. This advance was done with Britain’s consent and with the intent of surrounding the French beachhead at Aussa, which included the areas of Obok and Djibouti on Ethiopia’s northern border. The Italians promised the Ethiopians that their agreement was not disturbed but the falsity of this statement became apparent as the Italians began to close off the import of arms to the ruling group in Ethiopia. Ethiopia responded in 1887 with a military stance at Dogali. Not desiring a mountainous campaign Italy called on Britain to negotiate the crisis. Britain sent an envoy to Yohannes, then emperor asking him to consider ceding portions of Ethiopia. Angered by Britain’s reneging Yohannes wrote to the Queen of England and told her that there would be peace only when Italians were back in Italy and Ethiopians were in Ethiopia.
War was imminent so the Emperor pulled his troops from the Sudanese border to reinforce the front against the Italians. The Mahdists realized this opportunity to advance and did so. In response to the new situation, the emperor rushed to the Matamma area to resist the disturbance with some of his army. Though the Ethiopian troops were victorious, the emperor was killed with a stray bullet. The year was 1889.
Yohannes’ army did not survive the news of his death. The central state dissipated. Northern Ethiopia was suffering from cattle plagues, resulting famine and disease. During this time of confusion the Italians advanced and established the colony of Eritrea. Confident in its future as an empire, Italy endorsed the ascendancy of Menelik, a leader of the Shoa region of Ethiopia, to the position of Ethiopia’s emperor. Italy felt somewhat safe with Menelik because its relationship with him had been cordial during the altercations with the previous regime.
Because of this friendship with Italy, Menelik was able, as King of Shoa (1865-1889), to forcibly conquer the rich regions of Arussi, Harar, Kulo and Konta to the south and southeast, and Gurage and Wallaga to the southwest. On May 2, 1889, Menelik and Italy signed a treaty at the Ethiopian village of Wuchale. In this agreement Menelik recognized Italian sovereignty over most of Eritrea. Italy recognized Menelik as the emperor of Ethiopia. The agreement, however, was problematic and short-lived.
The treaty was craftily written in both Amharic and Italian. The Italian version implied that Italy had sovereignty over all Ethiopia. This was unacceptable to Menelik and he sent an envoy to Rome to reissue the treaty in its original form. Italy did this but on 11 October 1889, reasserted its claim to a protectorate over Ethiopia to the other European powers. When Menelik informed these same powers of his coronation to take place on 3 November 1889, they embarrassed him by informing him that they could not communicate directly with him since he and Ethiopia came under the protection of Italy. Britain went as far as to negotiate the borders and frontiers of Italy’s claims between 1891 and 1894.
Feeling able to do so, and in accordance to the Berlin Treaty, Italy advanced from Eritrea farther inland to Tigre. Italy occupied the town of Adowa in January 1890 and informed Menelik that they would not withdraw until he recognized the Italian version of the Wuchale treaty (Akpan 1985). In a secure manner, Italy staked its claim in Europe and negotiated frontiers with Britain.
Menelik was also busy during this apparent standoff period. He intelligently manipulated the competitive nature of European empires to increase his advantage. He imported large quantities of arms from Russia and France. Using this technical advantage he forcibly consolidated Shoa’s neighboring polities into a centralized military state. Yohannes had imagined and elaborated Ethiopia but it was under Menelik’s management that it was consolidated (Tibebu 1995). Backed by 82,000 rifles and twenty-eight cannon, this consolidate Ethiopia denounced the Wuchale treaty on February 12, 1893.
Under this new Ethiopian posture, a fifth column emerged behind the Italian front. Led by Batha Hagos, an Eritrean rebellion broke out in December of 1894. The Italians launched a counter-attack in Tigré during the following month. In September the Ethiopian army marched north and by the end of December had defeated the Italians in the towns of Amba Alagi and Makalle. By the end of 1895, Italy fell back to the town of Adowa.
Italy was at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage. Ethiopia had 1,000,000 men with modern rifles. Italy had 17,000 troops, one third of which were Eritrean conscripts. Italy had 56 cannon to Ethiopia’s 40 but this was not decisive. Ethiopia had the advantage of familiarity with the terrain while Italians maps were full of error. The most significant factor was the collusion of the local population with the Ethiopian army. These populations had experienced the direct oppression of Italian colonialism, which had begun the process of seizing land to support Italian settlers. Local populations enhanced the eyes and ears of the Ethiopian Army enabling them to roundly defeat the Italian colonialist force. On October 26, 1896, the Italians capitulated and agreed to the Peace Treaty of Addis Ababa. This treaty nullified the Wuchale agreement and recognized the complete independence of Ethiopia. It did not, however, mention Italy’s abdication of Eritrea. This was probably because Menelik’s vision of Ethiopia did not automatically include Eritrea.
Nevertheless, the Ethiopian victory gave it respect in the only way that one could obtain respect during the time of imperial expansion. The respect was global. Diplomatic missions came to Ethiopia from France, Britain, the Sudanese Mahdists, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, and the Tsar of Russia (Akpan 1985). Although V. B. Thompson equated the battle of Adowa to the battle of Issandhlawana in 1879 (1969), in which the British were temporarily shaken, the routing of Italy was more complete.
The outcome of the battle, the greatest victory of an African over a European army since the time of Hannibal, was of major significance in the history of Europe’s relations with Africa. The Ethiopians acquired prestige throughout the Red Sea area, as note by the Polish traveler, Count Potocki, who remarked that the Somali displayed ‘race-pride on the victory of their neighbours over a great European power.’ (Akpan 1985, 272-273)
Here we see first hand the developing of a sense of supra-identity of being a victorious African in the face of an encroaching outsider. This feeling was not only felt on the African continent.
Increasing interest in Ethiopia, the last indigenous independent state in black Africa, was also evinced by black intellectuals in the New World. The Haitian, Benito Sylvain, one of the first apostles of pan-Africanism, travelled to Ethiopia four times between 1889 and 1906, carrying letters to and from President Alexis of Haiti, while William H. Ellis, a black American of Cuban descent, visited the country twice in 1903 and 1904 with various plans for economic development and the settlement of black Americans. (Akpan 1985, 272-273)
Benito Sylvain was born and reared in Haiti but lived in France for a number of years and probably took advantage of France’s desire to see a victorious Ethiopia against an Italy-Britain partnership. “The Emperor Menelik actually made Sylvain a sort of representative of Ethiopia, a sort of diplomat” (Martin 1993, 11). Known for organizing the Black community in Paris, Sylvain founded the Black youth Association of Paris in 1898. He also attended the Pan-African Conference of 1900.
An Ethiopian impact was also felt in South Africa where the biblical prophecy about Ethiopia stretching forth her hands unto God had aroused South Africa by 1900. Increasing awareness of Ethiopia was later manifested by the appearance in 1911 of the Gold Coast intellectual J. E. Casely Hayford’s book, Ethiopia Unbound, which was dedicated ‘to the sons of Ethiopia the World Wide Over’. (Akpan 1985, 272-273)
In fact, Ethiopianism in South Africa preceded the battle of Adowa. “Ethiopian” churches, which reflected nationalist tendencies, began appearing in southern Africa in the 1870s (Martin 1983). The victory of 1896 must have been an amazing boost to these churches. Their faith in eventual victory was probably heightened as if prophecy was being fulfilled in the battle of Adowa.
In summary, how was this amazing feat accomplished? Tibebu attributed to the Ethiopian victory to three deciding factors:
1. Ethiopia imported more firearms from Europe than any other place in Africa at that time.
2. Ethiopia had a history of centuries of statehood with varying degrees of centrality. During the latter part of the 19th century there existed a part of the state that specialized in the art of war making as a vocation. This ‘warrior class’ (chawa, watadar) was an armed body that existed separate from the rest of the population, similar to a standing army.
3. Ethiopia had a cultural unity, a sense of oneness that was established ideologically through the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Ethiopians developed an identity that saw ‘others,’ beyond their righteous borders, as heathens (Tibebu 1995, 51).
To these points should be added: (1) the forced, yet timely consolidation of the various Ethiopian local polities, (2) the competitive nature of the European imperialists, and (3) the oppressive treatment of the indigenous population by Italy.
In modern history, the collusion and collision of imperial interests released a shock wave of activity and consciousness. Both of which became synthesized in the Nkrumahist paradigm. The epicenter of the first jolt took place at the battle of Adowa, in 1896. It was here that Italy suffered an early colonial defeat. That defeat left Africa its oldest independent political entity as the symbol independent African agency. Ethiopia would serve as a beacon of hope and potential until the Italian revenge of 1935.
Some of the factors for Ethiopia’s initial success against Italian imperialism mentioned above became the factors of its fragile defense against a recuperated aggressor. Garvey commented on the failure of Ethiopia’s ruling group to upgrade its ability to resist Italian aggression. Looking critically at the shortcomings of Emperor Haile Selassie Garvey wrote the following:
He kept his country unprepared for modern civilization, whose policy was strictly aggressive. He resorted sentimentally to prayer and to feasting and fasting, not consistent with the policy that secures the existence of present-day freedom for peoples whilst other nations and rulers are building up armaments of the most destructive kind as the only means of securing peace . . . and protection. . . . The results show that God had nothing to do with the campaign of Italy in Abyssinia, for on the one side we had the Pope of the Catholic Church blessing the Crusade, and the other, the Coptic Church fasting and praying with confidence of victory. . . . It is logical, therefore, that God did not take sides, but left the matter to be settled by the strongest human battalion. (Blackman, January 1937, 8)
Garvey, who had earlier sang the praises of the former Abyssinia that had defeated the Italians recognized that more than tradition was necessary to hold the imperialist at bay. This became a continuous concern and theme of Nkrumah’s in a later period when he would face the dilemma of tradition versus innovation.